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A distinctive feature of recent popular science writing is the parade of books by 
distinguished scientists – from Roger Penrose to Francis Crick and Gerald Edelman – 
which attempt solutions to the traditional problems of mind and consciousness. The 
Feeling of What Happens by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio lies squarely in this 
tradition, as did his earlier  Descartes’ Error. These books, like those of Penrose, 
Crick and others, attempt a difficult double task: to explain scientific results to the 
general reader and to use these results to illuminate the deepest mysteries of the 
human mind. Their declared aim is not to debunk the traditional philosophical debates 
and problems, but to solve them by the employment of rigorous science. There are 
two dangers implicit in this kind of project. One is that in trying to synthesise very 
different areas of knowledge, a thinker can easily run the risk of neglecting the 
subtleties of the area in which they are not an expert. The other is that the significance 
of particular scientific discoveries is often difficult to summarise for the non-
specialist, and the effect can be that the results of these self-proclaimed revolutionary 
syntheses can seem almost bathetic. The claim made with something of a flourish at 
the end of Consciousness by Edelman and Giulio Tononi that ‘consciousness arises 
from certain arrangements in the material order of the brain’ is something which 
would have been endorsed by Thomas Hobbes, and is virtually a commonplace in 20th 
century Anglophone philosophy. Of course, the interest is all in the details of how the 
brain produces conscious awareness. But these details are often technical, and resist 
simple summary. No scientist should have to expect that their work must be 
intelligible to a non-specialist, though many seem to think it ought to be. One is 
reminded of Stephen Hawking’s bizarre conjecture at the end of A Brief History of 
Time that when physicists eventually find an equation which unifies the fundamental 
physical forces, then it should ‘be understandable in broad principle by everyone, not 
just a few scientists’. But why? Certainly, many educated people know that Einstein’s 
famous equation is e=mc2; but how many even know what the ‘c’ stands for?  
The problem for much popular science is how to steer a course between 
stating the obvious (‘consciousness is produced by the brain’) and describing things 
whose proper understanding requires some specialist knowledge (e=mc2). Lise Eliot’s 
Early Intelligence manages to steer through the horns of this dilemma, presenting 
lucidly what is known about how the brain develops in early life (though the reader 
has to tolerate on the way some mawkish descriptions of the experience of child-care). 
But the price of clarity is a certain dullness, at least for the reader looking for answers 
to the traditional ‘nature versus nurture’ question. The bland (and obviously correct) 
answer suggested by Eliot’s book is that both inheritance and environment play a role 
in shaping a person’s mind. Once again, the interest is in the complex, messy details, 
which cannot be captured in any general slogan. 
Perhaps we would not need to be reminded of these obvious truths about 
scientific research, were it not for a widespread assumption that the traditional 
philosophical problem of consciousness has only become tractable since science got 
its hands on it. But this is an illusion. Damasio tells us that ‘science can now 
successfully distinguish among several components of the human mind’ and offers the 
distinction between consciousness and conscience as an example. But we did not need 
science to tell us this; all we needed was a dictionary. Similarly, in his readable 
account of the latest research on animal minds, Wild Minds, Marc Hauser dismisses 
the questions, ‘do animals think?’ and ‘are animals conscious?’ as unhelpful because 
they are ‘vague’, preferring to replace them with more ‘precisely specified’ questions, 
such as whether an animal can ‘understand its own beliefs’. But how could an animal 
understand its own beliefs if it were not a thinker, since understanding and believing 
are surely kinds of thinking? The first question is no vaguer than its ‘precise’ 
replacement. There can be an illusion of rigour in these discussions, a spurious sense 
that now that scientists are involved, the traditional concerns of the philosopher and 
the non-scientific reflective thinker can be sorted out. 
 Despite its many merits – most of which lie in his brilliantly lucid descriptions 
of his own neuropsychological research – Damasio’s latest book perpetuates this 
illusion. Central to his account of consciousness is a distinction between what he calls 
‘core consciousness’ which provides an organism with a sense of self about the ‘here 
and now’, and ‘extended consciousness’ which gives the organism an ‘elaborate’ 
sense of self. The distinction is suggestive, but it raises more questions than it 
answers. Philosophers have for a long time operated with a distinction between 
consciousness and self-consciousness: to be conscious is for the world to be present to 
one’s mind, while to be self-conscious is to be aware of oneself. There may be a 
reason to reject this distinction; but Damasio does not give us one. Rather, in 
assuming that core consciousness involves a ‘sense of self’ he builds the rejection of 
the traditional distinction into his starting point. The point is not that he is wrong to do 
this; it is rather that he shows no awareness that he is doing it at all.  
Like any subject of scientific explanation, discussions of consciousness need 
to start with a clear conception of the phenomena to be explained. But in the case of 
consciousness, there is an especially acute danger of being captivated by an image or 
picture of the inner life, which can lead at best to dead-ends and at worst to confusion. 
Damasio describes one problem of consciousness as that of how we get a ‘movie-in-
the-brain’, but although he notes the limitations of this metaphor, he does not mention 
its most obvious limitation: being conscious of the world is nothing like watching a 
movie. When we watch a movie, we are aware of something happening in a 
represented space, and we are aware of the boundaries of that space. Ordinary states 
of consciousness, by contrast, do not involve awareness of a represented space, or of 
representations at all; we feel ourselves to be immersed in the world which we 
perceive. Descartes, often portrayed in these discussions (as he is by Damasio) as the 
source of many misconceptions about the mind, described things so much more 
convincingly: ‘I not lodged in my body, like a pilot in his ship, but I am joined to it 
very closely and indeed so compounded and intermingled with my body, that I form, 
as it were, a single whole with it.’ Trying to combine this important insight with the 
metaphor of the movie in the brain leads nowhere. Whatever Descartes’s error was, it 
did not lie in his description of the phenomena of consciousness; scientists of 
consciousness may still have much to learn from the antiquated philosophers. 
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